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INTRODUCTION
One of the significant developments of modern times
has been the rapid growth in the size and complexity of
public and private organizations. Decisions made by mili-
tary and industrial leaders affect large amounts of capital
and numerous people. Errors can be extremely expensive and
an incorrect decision may require years to rectify. Further,
decisions must be made quickly to match the increasing speed
and change of modern human endeavors. Failure to act rapidly
may provide a competitor with a marked advantage.
Since World War II, men have turned increasing effort
toward improving the speed and accuracy of decision making
by application of analytical and objective methods. The
techniques for optimizing decisions presented in this thesis,
represent an important part of those methods
The optimization techniques explored here have potenti-
ally a wide application in the field of petroleum management.
These are: linear programming, game theory, and inventory
theory. Chapter III includes a brief discussion of queueing
theory and Chapter IV concerns the optimization of purchas-
ing policies.
The treatment of each field endeavors to include a sur-
vey of the extensive literature covering the technique and
provides an evaluation of appropriate source material. The
techniques are presented in some detail with specific refer-
ences suggested where it is considered that the reader may

desire exhaustive treatment of a particular facet. Proofs
are not offered but are generally available in the refer-
ences. The application of each technique to various mili-
tary and industrial petroleum problems is handled in the
form of assumed problems or as a discussion of applications
believed appropriate to petroleum problems facing the mili-
tary establishment.
Before proceeding, it is considered appropriate to
describe the general characteristics which are common to
each of the optimization techniques covered in this thesis.
The methods discussed are those which seek to optimize the
effectiveness of operating systems.
Measure of Effectiveness
In order to compare the effectiveness of various alter-
native courses of action, a scale of some type, usually nu-
merical, must be selected as a measure of effectiveness.
This may be in units of dollars, hours, successes per hundred
attempts, barrels per day, or it may be dimensionless, such
as the probability of destruction of a target. The effec-
tiveness may depend on a number of variables, some of which
are beyond the control of the decision maker. All factors
must be accounted for in a model which serves to relate the
various alternatives to the effectiveness of the system.
Model Formulation
Basic to the solution of a problem involving an operat-
ing system, is the development of a model. Models can be

highly mathematical - and either deterministic or probabalis-
tic - or they can be qualitative and non-mathematical. The
primary function of a model is to provide a means of bring-
ing together the facts and data bearing on the problem. As
a substitute for the real system, the model can be manipu-
lated to test various alternatives in a way which an actual
system can rarely be handled. The degree of correlation
between the actual system and its model is a partial measure
of the limitations which must be recognized in the solution.
Sub-Optimization
It is possible to optimize the cost of operation of a
catalytic cracking unit but to do so at the expense of the
overall long term profits of the refinery. The selection
of the proper level at which to optimize operations, is an
important decision. Optimization at too low a level leads
to sub-optimization. At the same time, the problem at a
higher level may become so complex that an adequate solu-
tion becomes extremely difficult if not impossible.
The optimization techniques presented in this thesis
include an important segment of the analytical and objec-
tive methods which are being -increasingly applied by govern-





The techniques of linear programming have been utilized
extensively and with considerable success in many instances.
It should be noted that such techniques are applicable to
some, but not all of the problems encountered in programming,
Among the numerous operating systems, there are many in
which the fundamental relationships of the variables are
linear in character. The scientific study of such systems,
with the aim of optimizing selected factors, has led to the
development of the theory of linear programming.
A number of authorities have indicated that linear
programming is related to and developed from economic theory,
Historically, VonNeumann, Neisser and others recognized
during the 1950' s that the simple version of the Walrasian
general equilibrium could not be adequately treated in terms
of the number of equations and unknowns. More recent inter-
pretations of the early work of Frederick Taylor, Smith and
Walras by economists such as Samuelson, gave impetus to the
development of linear programming.
In 19^5* George Stigler developed a solution to the
diet problem which involved determination of adequate diet
at minimum cost for 77 foods and 9 nutrients. He determined
that optimum diet in 1939 consisted of wheat flour, cabbage
and dried Navy beans and cost $39.93 for the year .

Organized research in the area of linear programming
was conducted in the U.S. Air Force Project SCOOP (Scienti-
fic Computation of Optimum Programs). The outstanding con-
tribution of this project was made by George B. Dantzig in
19^7 when he set forth the mathematical statement of the
general linear programming problem and developed a means
of solution known as the simplex method. Prior to this
time, many problems had been unsolvable even though recog-
p
nized as linear programming problems .
Other contributions were made by Hitchcock (19^1) and
Koopmans (19^7) who independently developed the transpor-
tation problem and by Charnes who extended the application
of the simplex method.
The difficulty of solution of long linear programming
problems by manual calculation has led to the use of elec-
tronic computers which add nothing to the theory but pro-
vide tremendous calculating speed. The first successful
use of a computer in the solution of a linear programming
problem was on the Bureau of Standards SEAC in 195^.
Most electronic computers have now been programed to solve
the simplex algorithm and linear programming has become a
powerful tool in the optimization of operating systems.
EVALUATION OF BIBLIOGRAPHY
A very real problem exists in selecting sources of in-
formation for preparation of a paper on linear programming
methods and applications. While the material available on

the subject has sprung forth only in the years since World
War II, the volume of articles, books and studies in this-
area has become a veritable flood. It has not been possible
to review more than a portion of the books and articles in-
volving linear programming, but a conscientious effort has
been made to select those which appear to be applicable in
the light of my subject. The 865 page annotated bibliogra-
phy, Operations Research by Batchelor , has been of consider-
able assistance and is recommended to those seeking sources
on methods and applications.
The basic work in linear programming done by Dantzig,
Charnes, Koopmans, and Kuhn has led the author to utilize
works by these men in the theoretical areas where possible.
However, the developments of these men are effectively pre-
sented in more readable form in the basic text covering
linear programming by Gass-'. For those interested essenti-
ally in learning and applying the techniques of linear pro-
gramming, the book by Gass is recommended as well as the
c
sections on linear programming by Saaty and Churchman,
Ackoff and Arnoff^.
For applications to military and industrial petroleum
8 Qproblems, the work done by Alan S. Marine ' , and Gifford
H. Symonds is excellent in the areas of refinery operation.
For applications involving tanker scheduling and other as-
pects of the transportation problem, the work done by
11 12Dantzig and Fulkerson as well as Flood
,
provides an ex-
cellent basis for further study.

For the reader interested in additional research in
the area of linear programming, it is suggested that a
review be made of the bibliography on linear programming
1*5
by Vera Riley and Saul Gass .
Mathematical Methods of Linear Programming
Programming is the planning of an operation for the
purpose of optimizing the result. The objective may be to
minimize costs or to maximize returns. It may also be to
allocate efficiently limited or constrained resources to
meet specific objectives. The number of solutions may be
infinite, but the best or optimum solution must satisfy
both the conditions or constraints of the problem as well
as the objective.
When linear (straight line) constraints are assumed
together with a linear objective, optimization requires the
solution of a linear programming problem. Assumptions of
linearity are frequently appropriate, however, it may be
found that the objective function is non-linear and that
use of such a function improves the result. It is considered
that non-linear programming, is outside the scope of this
thesis and no treatment of the subject is included. Exten-
sive information on this subject may be found in 14 and 15.
The General Linear Programming Problem
The mathematical model of the general linear programming
problem consists of a set of simultaneous linear inequations
which represent the conditions or constraints of the problem

8and a linear function which describes the objective of the
problem. Mathematically a linear programming problem may
be formulated by letting a,., b., and c. be sets of known
coefficients with (i = 1, . .., m; j =1, ..., n) and also
letting x.(j =1, ...,n) be a set of unknown variables.
In the general linear programming problem, we seek
solution sets which may be regarded as vectors, X >= (x., , xp ,
..., x ), which satisfy the linear inequalities previously
referred to as constraints, and at the same time maximize
the linear objective function.
The inequalities in the general case are of the form:
n
Y a±J Xj i b± (i = 1, ..., m) (1-1)
The foregoing is a condensed notational form which can
be more easily understood in expanded form as shown here:
all xl + a12x2 + • • • + ainxn ^ bl
a21 xl + a22x2 + • • • + a2nxn ^ b2
a
m,l sl + am2x2 + '•' + amnxn < bm
It is also established that the values of the variables
are positive and the solution set is thus subject to the
constraint:
Xj £ (j = 1, ...., n) (1-2)

The linear objective function which is to be maximized
is of the general form:
Z =£ C.Xj (1-3)








x2 + ... +
C.x,
Before attempting to illustrate a solution, let us
examine the problem structure briefly. Equation (1-3) de-
fines the objective function, Z, which is linear in each
value of x.. It is a function of the vector X = (x-,, xp ,
..., x ) and may be expressed as:
Z = f (x) (1-4)
This function is defined for all values of x with finite
components, but must also satisfy the restrictions of equa-
tions (1-]) and (1-2).
Equation (1-2) is usually called the non-negativity
restriction and requires that only positive values of x be
considered. Equation (l-l) requires that feasible solutions
satisfy m linear inequalities generally termed "constraints",
The linear programming problem may be stated in an
equivalent form where a linear function is to be minimized
and the constraints are ^ instead of £. Since this problem
is obtained from the general problem described by multiply-
ing the inequalities by -1 and maximizing -Z, this case can





The primary methods of solution of the general linear
programming problem are the geometric method, the relaxation
method, the method of double description and the simplex
method. Consideration of the geometric method will serve
to illustrate and clarify the problem and is therefore in-
cluded at this point. A discussion of the simplex method,
which is the most frequently used technique, will also be
given.
Geometric Method
Geometrically, a solution to the linear programming
problem is a point of the convex set defined by the con-
straints which also maximizes (minimizes) the objective
function.
To illustrate, let us consider a simple production
problem of a manufacturer of two types of lubricating oil.
Both items require the use of common equipment and labor.
The objective of the company is to maximize profits on the
two products. It is assumed that a fixed market price is
established and that there are six fixed resources to be
allocated to the production of the two items. These are
the hours of skilled and unskilled labor available, the
number of machine hours available on two blending machines
through which both products must pass and two items of
blending stock required as raw materials.
Let x, and Xp be the respective quantities of the two
lubricants to be produced. Assuming 5 and 8 to be the

11





The constraints are expressed as:
(1) x2 <£ 3 Skilled labor
(2) x1 + 2x2 < 7 Unskilled labor




+ x2 < 15
Machine 2
(5) 4x1 + 3x2 < 40 Blending Stock A
(6) ^ + 2x2 < 20 Blending Stock B
and non-negativity restrictions are
x2 ^
Because of the non-negativity restrictions we are con-
cerned only with the first quadrant and the planes of the
constraints appear as lines in two dimensions. See Figure 1.
The solution set which satisfies the conditions of the con-
straints is thus a polygon as shown and is both bounded and
convex. We are thus assured of at least one optimal solu-
tion and there are alternate optimal programs only if the
objective function is parallel to one of the sides of the
polygon. It will be noted that the only constraints which
affect the solution set are those of skilled and unskilled
labor and machine hours on the first machine only. All





Figure 2 illustrates the geometric method by consider-
ing a family of planes for different values of the objec-
tive function. It will be noted that the maximum Z, being
the greatest distance from the origin, is a line through P
with Z = 31 and a slope of - 8/5. The optimum solution thus
calls for production of 2 units of x
2
and 3 units of x,. An











labor available is not limiting, and further savings could
be made by adjusting inventories and resources to the end
that all constraints will pass through the point P2 , the
optimum solution.
Simplex Method
The simplex method as developed by Dantzig provided the
first practicable and simple system for solving linear
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programming problems with large numbers of variables. As
originally proposed the method did not adequately handle
certain degenerate cases; however, work by Charnes resolved
these problems and the simplex method was made workable with-
out the restriction of non-degeneracy. The most complete
coverage of the simplex method is set forth by Charnes
This treatment is exhaustive. For the reader interested
in simply learning to apply the technique, the presentations
given by Gass , Churchman , and Sasieni y are recommended.
The simplex method is an iterative procedure and each
iteration consists of translating the plane of the objective
function parallel to itself for successive values of Z and
evaluating its distance from the origin at the vertex of the
convex set. This can be more adequately explained by re-
ferring to figure 2. Although the figure is in only two
dimensions, the convex set can be visualized as describing
a polyhedron formed by the planes of the constraints. One
seeks the point of the polyhedron (generally on the boundary
and usually at a corner or vertex) through which the Z plane
may pass and which plane corresponds to a maximum value of
Z. In the simplex process planes of Z are passed succes-
sively through the corners or extreme points of the polyhed-
ron, advancing away from the origin with increasing values
of Z, until a maximum (optimal) solution is obtained.
The simplex process also utilizes a criterion which
eliminates some of the points as possible solutions. The
number of iterations required varies but is frequently about
twice the number of inequalities.
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The first step in the simplex method is to convert the
system of m linear inequalities to a system of m linear
equations. This is accomplished by the insertion of "slack
variables", x^-t, x^?' ••••*
^-n+m'
one for each of the in ~
equalities which then becomes:
allxl + a12x2 + * * ' + alnxn + xn+l = bi
a21Xl + a22X2 + • • • + a2nxn + + xn+2 = b2
(1-5)
ml 1 m2 2 mn n + x . = b
n+m m
The use of the slack variables above is simply a device
used in arriving at an optimal solution. The use of these
slack or idle factors will be more readily understood in
the numerical example to be given later in this chapter.
Having converted the inequalities to equalities (1-5),
the problem can be restated as one of finding among all sets
of points (x., x2 , ...., x ), that point which satisfies
the constraints (1-5) with non-negative values of x. and
J











The basic theorem behind the simplex technique states,
in effect, that a set (x., , x , ..... x
,
) which maximizes12 n+m
the objective function and satisfies the constraints, must
necessarily have n elements which are zero. If the coordi-
nates were known, we could substitute their values in the
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constraints and would then have m equations and m unknowns
which could be solved algebraically for the optimal solu-
tion. Without this knowledge, it is necessary to proceed
step by step to a solution.
The procedure may be explained as follows:
Choose n of the n + m variables and give them a value of
zero. Utilizing these values, the constraints may then be
solved for the remaining m variables. Solutions with nega-
tive values for some variables are discarded as violating
the non-negativity restrictions and another set of n vari-
ables is selected for trial as zero variables. When the
values of all coordinates or variables of the solution set
are non-negative, we have a feasible solution. This is the
starting point of the iterative procedure.
The simplex method also permits a test of the feasible
solution for optimality, and, if not optimal, the method
allows one to proceed directly to a new feasible solution
with an improved Z. Ultimately the procedure leads to an
optimum solution.
Application of the simplex technique involves extensive
use of matrix representation and manipulation of the rows
in a series of steps until a solution can be read from it.
To illustrate the manner in which this is done, a numerical
example will be presented here.
Numerical Example of Simplex Method




Z = 3x1 + 5x2 + ^ (1-7)
subject to the linear constraints:
2x
1# + 3x2 £ 8




+ 2x2 + Kx^ £ 15
Step One. Use of Slack Variables
By introduction of "slack variables", which essentially
are additional variables, the inequalities become equalities.
The slack variables are non-negative and take the form, Xj,,
Xr, and xg in this example. The inequalities (1-8) thus
become the following equations:
(1-9)
The first goal of the simplex method is to obtain a
feasible solution associated with an extreme point of the
solution set. Such a feasible solution is available after
the first "tableau" or matrix of coefficients has been
formed. However,, it will be necessary to continue to exa-
mine other extreme points in a series of tableaus until a
maximum solution is obtained.
Equation (l-9), can now be written in matrix form, mark-
ing the columns of coefficients as P., , P2 , ... Pg and using
PQ for the column of constants. Below the matrix is row C.
where the coefficients of the objective function are entered.




+ 5*3 + Xr- =10





2 3 1 8
2 5 1 10
















Step Two. First Feasible Solution
In the foregoing matrix, a feasible solution can be
read off, so long as the non-negativity restriction is not
violated. This solution has been entered in a row below
the objective function.
This first feasible solution was obtained by setting
the variables x.,, x? , and x^, equal to zero. The solution is
read off by selecting the non-zero variables to be those
whose columns contain a single "1", with the rest being zeros,
Columns Pj,, P,_, and Pg are thus chosen and for convenience
are shown in the P. column in the box at the left. The co-
efficients of corresponding variables, x., in the objective
function are inserted in the column marked C. in the same
box, again for convenience. With all variables at zero in
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the constraining functions, except the slack variables, the
feasible solution is x, = x„ = x, =0 and xu =8, x,- = 10,
Xg = 15. This is indicated in the solution row of the first
tableau. The value of Z associated with this solution can
be seen to be zero (Z =v0) since the variables x-,, x^, and
x, in the objective function have values of zero for this
first feasible solution.
Step Three. Test for Optimality
This is accomplished by computing an evaluation, A.,




-£ Hi c± (1-10)
At this point in the process, where the set of non
zero variables is just the set of slack variables, it can
be seen that A. = C. for each j. This can be explained by
pointing out that in computing A. for the first variable in
the solution of our example, we take the value of C, which
is 3 and subtract from this the sum of the products of the
three values in the C. column times their corresponding
values in the column designated P. in the matrix.
Since all values in the C column are zero at this
stage, the products are zero. Thus the summation term is
zero and:
\ » 3 - = 3
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Similarly A? = 5 and A, = 4. The A values are entered in
the row below the solution in the first tableau.
Interpreting the Test
If one or more of the A. are positive, the solution is
not optimal and we must proceed to the next step. If all
of the A.'s are zero or negative, the solution is optimal.
However, if in the latter case, some of the A.'s are zero
while others are negative, more than one optimal solution
exists having the same value for Z. If all A.'s are nega-
tive and none are zero, a unique optimal solution has been
found.
Step Four. Computing the Entering Variable
To form the next matrix, we must find the entering
variable, x , which is that zero variable in the feasible
solution which is to be non-zero in the next iteration.
The entering variable must have the following character-
istics:
1. It is zero in the present matrix
2. It has a A. ^
5. One of the matrix coefficients, a. ., in the column
x. must be greater than zero
J
While several variables in a solution might be chosen,
the problem solution converges quickly if the entering vari-
able, x , is chosen as that one £or which A. is largest.
In checking the first solution it can be seen that the
second variable in the solution, has the necessary prerequisites
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and has the largest A.. It is thus marked "entering vari-
able" in the first tableau.
Step Five. Determining the Departing Variable
The departing variable, x , is that non-zero variable
in the feasible solution which is to become zero in the next
iteration. The departing variable is generally determined
by the selection of the entering variable and by the non-
negativity restrictions on the coordinates. It is first
necessary to compute a quotient:
Vair (1~11)
for each non-zero term in the solution. The values of b.
are located in the solution while the values of a. are
found in the column of the previously selected entering
variable. For the first quotient we compute:
V*ir=J
From among the three quotients calculated, the one in column
Pj,, is the smaller and thus determines the departing vari-
ables. The departing variable is designated in the first
tableau.
Step Six. Calculate the New Matrix
To calculate the new coefficient matrix, it is neces-
sary to perform several row operations on the prior matrix.
The need for the entering and departing variables now be-
comes apparent. These two variables locate a position in
the matrix which is marked with a box. The new matrix is
to have a 1 in this position. By dividing the elements of
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the first row by 3, which is the value in the designated
position, unity is obtained in that position in the new
matrix shown here.
2/5 1 1/5 8/5
2 5 1 10
3 2 4 1 15- •
The new matrix also must contain zeros in the other
positions of the designated column. This is done by sub-
tracting appropriate multiples of the new row from the
other rows of the matrix.
The second intermediate matrix then becomes:
2/5 1 1/5 8/5
-V5 5 "2/5 1 1 14/5
5/5 4 -2/5 1 29/5
!
The new tableau can now be written.
Second Tableau
?2
2/5 l 1^ 8/5
-V5 5 -2/5 1 14/5




Solution 8/5 14/5 29/5 (Z=40/5)
A
1
-1^ - 4 -5/5 -






Here it will be noted that the second feasible solution
is again read off by selecting the non-zero variables to be
those whose columns contain a single "1" with the rest zeros.
This marks the beginning of another iteration. By repeating
steps 1 through 6, an optimum solution will be reached. In
this problem, a total of four tableaus are required in order
to reach an optimum solution. The third and fourth are
obtained in the same manner and are shown below.
Third Tableau
2/5 1 1/5 8/5
-V15 1 -2/15 1/5 14/15
41/15 -2/15
-V5 1 89/15
Cj 3 5 4
Solution 8/5 1V15 89/15 (Z=256/15)
A
j











5 P2 1 15A1 8/41 -10/41 50/41
4 P
3
1 -6/41 5/41 4/41 62/41








Since in this final tableau, all A. are non-positive,
an optimum solution has been obtained.
Degeneracy
The problem of degeneracy exists in the simplex tech-
nique when the vectors chosen are not linearly independent.
In such cases, more than n vectors pass through the same
point which in turn is described by the fact that more than
m of the original m + n variables are zero. Under these
conditions the value of the objective function remains un-
changed by each iteration of the simplex method and the pro-
cedure continues to cycle.
Degeneracy problems seldom occur in actual cases and,
therefore, no attempt will be made to cover the means of
20
solving such problems here. Gass has an extensive discus-
pi
sion of the solution of degeneracy problems and Saaty




One other aspect of linear programming should be men-
tioned before proceeding to the types of problems and appli-
cations possible with linear programming. This is the
presence of a dual problem which is related to the original
problem both in formulation and in the existence of a solu-
tion.
The pair of linear programming problems shown here are
duals of each other:














i C.x. = Z is a maximum
Find Y = (y19
such that:
'•' ym^
I aUyi * C J
i b.y. = W is a minimum
withThe coefficients a... b. and C. are constantsij i J
equal values in both the primal and the dual. Under these
conditions it is apparent that there is a close relation
22between the two solutions. Kuhn and Tucker indicate the
following properties are among those characteristic of dual
programs
:
a. Either both the minimization and maximization have
optimal solutions or neither does.
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b. A feasible vector X is optimal, only if there is
a feasible vector Y such that Z = W. Similarly,
a feasible vector Y is optimal if there is a
feasible vector X such that Z = W for these vectors.
c. If both the primal and dual problems have optimal
solutions, then max Z = min W.
These properties indicate that the maximum value of Z
can be found by determining the minimum value of W, or vice
versa. If W has no minimum value, it then follows that Z
has no maximum. Thus in any problem in which only min W. or
max Z are to be determined, either the primal or the dual
may be solved.
In selecting the problem to be solved, primal or dual,
the one most easily solved should be used. If geometric
techniques are used, the problem with the least number of
variables should be chosen. The reverse is generally true
for the simplex method which is well suited to the solution
23
of the dual. Churchman ' indicates that the number of itera-
tions required for the simplex method is from 1 to 1 1/2
times the number of rows or constraints. Examples of con-
24
version from primal to dual are given by Gass
Special Linear Programming Problems
Of the many forms of linear programming problems, several
can be grouped by type and special techniques have been
developed for their solution. Among these are the assign-
ment and transportation problems which are important enough




This group consists of problems where there are n re-
sources and n uses to which the resources are to be applied.
Each resource or origin is to be associated with one and
only one use or destination and we wish to assign the asso-
ciations in such a way as to maximize (or minimize) the
summed effectiveness. Problems may involve supplies, person-
nel, or equipment to be assigned to demands or jobs. Among
those who have made significant contributions in this area
Hitchcock, Flood, Kuhn, and Dwyer. The techniques have been
applied profitably in making optimal assignments of person-
2S
nel, equipment, etc. A bibliography by Riley and Gass ^
contains references to a number of such applications. As
a special case of linear programming, the assignment problem
p
can be solved by simplified means. In an n matrix, if
n = 8, there are 8.' or ^0,j520 combinations to be examined.
A simplex solution could be used but a technique developed
by Flood is simpler and can be utilized without use of a
computer. A detailed example of this method is given in
26Flagle^.
The Transportation Problem
The transportation problem is a generalization of the
assignment problem. The matrix of effectiveness is no
longer necessarily square; however, the problem is essenti-
ally one of selecting optimum programs for distributing a
homogeneous product where s. units are positioned at origin
0. and d. units are required at destination D.. The cost
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of transportation of a single unit from 0. to D. is denoted
by C. . and our objective is to minimize C = ) x. . C.
.,
ij
the total cost of distribution where supply equals demand.
If supply is less than demand and no preferential destina-
tions exist, then we can assume the availability of fictici-
ous supplies which can be distributed at no cost. This pro-
cedure makes it possible to treat the problem as if supply
equaled demand. The variable x. . represents the quantity
of units moved from 0. to D. and therefore
) x. . = s. and ) x . . = d.. The condition of supply equals
i i
demand is denoted as ) s^ = ) d
.
i i
Transportation problems can be solved by the simplex
method and other techniques but the "transportation technique"
is the one most frequently used. Several examples of the
transportation problem are included in most texts on opera-
tions research. An extensive transportation problem solved
27by the simplex method can be found in Saaty '
.
APPLICATIONS OP LINEAR PROGRAMMING
The JP5 Jet Fuel Problem
A question which is currently a concern of the U. S. Navy
is one regarding the capacity of the petroleum industry to
produce JP5 jet fuel. This information is desired, not only
to determine the availability of JP5 during periods of war
or peace, but also to consider expanding use of this type of
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jet fuel and the effect that increased demand may have on
the price to be paid for JP5.
No attempt will be made to answer these questions
directly, but an approach to the problem will be discussed
as an application of the use of linear programming tech-
niques to solve military petroleum problems. A survey of
attempts to answer similar questions, reveals that the work
28done by Dr. Alan S. Manne in 1956 for the Rand Corporation
in developing a linear programming model of the U.S. petro-
leum refining industry, can well serve as a basis for solu-
tion of the questions concerning JP5- The mathematical
model, constructed by Manne, was one of a series of process
analysis models aimed at depicting the technological capabi-
lities of the entire national economy. In general, the pur-
pose of these studies was to provide quantitative answers
on production capabilities and also to weigh the effects of
product substitutions and alternate production processes.
The general question Manne sought to answer was: With
the crude oils and refineries available in the U. S. , what
product-mix possibilities existed between the output of JP4
jet fuel and the output of other refinery products, and
what would be the effect of a loss of a portion of refining
capacity?
To answer these and other questions in regard to JP5
jet fuel requires the construction of a linear programming
model covering both U. S. crude oil production and the opera-
tion of the nation's refining industry. The model must

J>0
incorporate the details of the manufacture of JP5 and all
other major products: 115/1^5 avgas; 100/1^0 avgas; JP4
jet fuel; kerosene; premium mogas; regular mogas; diesel;
Navy special; the several grades of fuel oil; lube oils;
asphalt; coke; liquefied petroleum gases; and basic aroma-
tic chemicals.
The JP4 jet fuel model developed by Manne, did not
take into consideration the problems of geographic loca-
tion or the limitations imposed by transportation, new
facilities or accumulation of inventories. It is under-
stood that further work in this area has been done by T. A.
Marschak but information on this work could not be located
at this writing. Manne indicates that Marschak has stream-
lined the technological details of the model discussed here
and constructed a four region model, (East, Midwest, Gulf
Coast, and West) which includes limitations on transporta-
tion. Such a model would probably give an improved repre-
sentation of production, refining and transportation. Manne
acknowledges that a model including provisions for location
and time can be constructed but that the costs of computa-
tion were prohibitive at that time (195*0 •
The model constructed by Manne based calculations on a
reference date, 1 January 1953, and assumed that both equip-
ment capacities and crude oil availability were set at the
maximum rate estimated for that date. He based all specifi-
cations (octane number, performance number, boiling range,
aromatics content, vapor pressure and viscosity) on the
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averages prevailing on that date. He further assumed that
labor, power, catalysts and sulfuric acid were not limit-
ing. The model did, however, consider the refinery inputs
of isopentane, natural gasoline, tetraethyl lead, heat, and
C2, C3 and C4 gases in addition to crude oil.
One of the simplifications in the model was considera-
tion of 25 categories of crude oil only. Based upon data
compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Mines, a sample of the 25
leading U. S. crude oils was selected. Because of the vari-
ations in analysis of individual crude oils, assuming a
single "composite" crude would not allow for the tendency
of various types of refinery equipment to utilize the most
suitable crude.
It was also assumed that the various types of refining
processes can be designated by broad categories but not by
individual patents. No distinction was made between Fluid
Catalytic Cracking of Universal Oil Products Company and
the Thermofore Catalytic Cracking of the Houdry Corporation
since product yields of the two processes are similar.
Catalytic Cracking and Catalytic Reforming, however, are
distinct and were treated separately.
The Linear Programming Model
The model developed by Manne was a conventional linear
programming type with numerous constraining inequalities and
an objective function to be maximized. The model allowed
numerous possibilities for varying the product-mix. Choices
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could be made at the three main steps of the refining se-
quence: atmospheric crude distillation, conversion of
straight-run products into blending stocks and the blend-
ing of the end items. In general the constraints intro-
duced in the model were in six classes: (l) equipment capa-
city, (2) crude oil availability, (3) refinery gases and
straight-run streams, (k) converted streams, (5) gasoline
and jet fuel specifications, and (6) end item requirements.
The objective function to be maximized represented a
product mix which, except for JP4 in this instance, was
proportional to the actual 1953 production of each item.
It was the purpose of the model, then, to maximize the
standard product mix, subject to producing specified amounts
of jet fuel. The requirement for jet fuel can be varied in
the model to coincide with the expected needs of the mili-
tary in a given situation. The model, in this way, provides
a substitution curve between the one group of refinery pro-
ducts and the jet fuel. Manne referred to these as "trade-
off" curves. The matrix for the model consisted of 105 rows
and 310 columns and solutions were obtained by the simplex
method which was programed for computer use. No attempt
will be made to reproduce the details of the model or its
solution here; however, it may be informative to show the
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Comparison between market prices and shadow prices
Figure 3 represents the trade-off curve between JP-4
jet fuel and the standard-product mix - with the various
assumptions and simplifications given It will be noted
that, except for \ short segments, the relationship is not
linear. The curve indicates that jet fuel cannot be sub
stituted for other products at a constant barrel for barrel
rate nor at a constant dollar for dollar rate. Examination
of the curve shows that as the volume of jet fuel increases,
the amount of other products which must be sacrificed be
comes increasingly greater. At low volumes of jet fuel, the
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trade-off curve shows that each barrel of jet fuel can be
produced at a cost of about 0.6 barrels of standard product
mix. However, at the extreme of about 3-29 million barrels
of jet fuel, 25 barrels of product mix is sacrificed for
each barrel of jet fuel. These figures should not be con-
sidered as exact amounts. Manne indicated that the curves
could only be considered- as estimates. In actual circum-
stances, industry would make adjustments and innovations
not possible to include in the model.
The point shown as actual output serves to indicate
that the model came fairly close to estimating actual out-
put. However, there are some factors within the model,
principally the supply of crude oil, which prevent the esti-
mate from straying too far from the actual. Manne instituted
an additional check on the model by comparing the shadow
prices of end items with actual market prices at the time.
A shadow price, in this model, represents the cost of an
item measured in terms of the standard product -mix. Given
the assumptions of the model and neglecting market factors
(which certainly are present for individual products),
prices should be proportional and lie on a 45° line between
the two price scales As will be noted in Figure k, while
the prices were not perfectly proportional, the correlation
was quite good and rough estimates of prices may be obtained
so long as the prices selected for comparison are within a
reasonable range of actual production volume. Such a pro-
cedure applied to a model designed to predict production of
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JP5 by the refining industry, may provide a rough estimate
of prices although it must be recognized that errors are
inherent in such a procedure.
In a second set of calculations made by Manne, it was
assumed that a reduction had been arbitrarily made in the
amount of refining equipment available. The trade-off
curve for the reduced equipment conditions is plotted in
Figure 3. The linear programming calculations and the
matrix were unchanged except for the reduced equipment con-
ditions. Capacities in this instance were reduced to a
range from 3>8 per cent to 51 per cent of the earlier levels,
The purpose was again to maximize the level of the non-jet
fuel product-mix subject to specific requirements for jet
fuel. As before, the first increment of J?^ was obtained
at small cost in terms of other fuels, but it increases
rapidly to about 17 barrels of product -mix per barrel of
jet fuel at a production rate of 1.7 million barrels of JP4.
Prior to the computation, it had been expected that at re-
duced capacity, it would be possible to select more desir-
able crudes and a much larger portion of the product -mix
could be converted into jet fuel. However, there was only
a relatively small difference in the maximum fraction of
jet fuel which could be produced from a barrel of crude.
In the initial calculations this fraction reached a maximum
of k^fo and with reduced equipment the fraction of crude con-
verted to jet fuel had a maximum of about 50$. A more
striking difference had been expected.
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It is considered that a similar model can be con-
structed to provide answers to questions on production of
JP5. The requirements made in the model by Marschak to in-
clude the effects of location and transportation should be
included as well as changes in refining processes and capa-
cities which have occurred since 1955- A model for JP5
will be complicated by the fact that in time of war, other
military fuels would be competing for a portion of the
total product-mix and that industry and civilian require-
ments would also be altered. Nevertheless it is considered
that such a linear programming model can be constructed and
manipulated to provide approximate answers to some of the
questions which are now unresolved. The ability of the
model to adjust for reduced capacities also permits con-
sideration of alternative actions in the event of destruc-
tion cf a portion of the nations refining capacity.
On the basis of the author's review of information re-
lating to the analysis of industry wide production and capa-
city problems, it is considered that linear programming
offers a generally satisfactory method of solution. Other
attempts to predict the capabilities of an economy have been
made using gross national product which usually lead to
overly optimistic results when applied to short range prob-
lems because they overstate the degree of substitutability
of products. On the other hand, using a single area of pro-
duction as a basis for prediction usually understates sub-
stitutability and consequently under-estimates capabilities.
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The Leontief interindustry flow model was an improvement
and efforts to correct the errors introduced by rigid assump-
tions in even this model have led to the use of linear pro-
gramming as an extension of Leontief 's original methods.
Linear programming allows both for the production of a
specific item by any of several items by a single process.
The development of an industry process analysis model
is not a simple nor inexpensive task. Success requires
close cooperation between the model builder, the sources of
data and the numerical analyst. Perhaps the most critical
area in constructing the model is in the collection of
truly significant data and an understanding by the model
-
builder of the use of such data. While difficult, it is
feasible to construct a model which will provide reasonably
good results. The use and interpretation of the results
then becomes the function of top management.
Additional applications of linear programming in re-





Competitive situations are distinguished by the fact
that two or more individuals are making decisions in situa-
tions involving conflicting interests and in which the out-
come is controlled by the decisions of all concerned. Such
situations are found in many social, political, economic
and military problems. Most of these situations involve
elements of chance but in each case it may be assumed that
each opponent will act in a rational manner and will attempt
to resolve the conflict in his favor.
Von Neumann developed an approach to competitive prob-
lems utilizing the minimax principle which has as its basic
idea the minimization of maximum loss. Von Neumann's ideas
have led to the development of a branch of mathematics
known as game theory in which the aim is to find the optimum
strategy for a competition.
The foundations of game theory were laid in the book,
" Theory of Games and Economic Behavior " by Von Neumann and
31 32Morgensterrr , first published in 19^. Newman^ , in coment-
ing on the social application of mathematics, wrote, -
"the theory of games can fairly be said to have laid the
foundation for the systematic and penetrating mathematical





However, a more recent survey of game theory by Luce and
•5 -3
Raiffa-^ indicates that there have been few applications in
the social sciences. The majority of applications have
been in military operations and in competitive industrial
problems such as bidding strategies.
During its short history, game theory has had a num-
ber of contributors. Among the more prominent are George
W. Brown who developed a method of finding solutions by
ficticious play, and J. D. Williams who defined a simple
method of interpereting equations called "the method of
oddments". H. Kuhn developed the "kernel method" for solu-
tion of finite games and George Dantzig proved game problems
could be converted to linear programming problems and vice
versa.
New mathematical tools are being created to develop
and extend the applications of game theory in the social
sciences, operations research, statistics and other fields.
EVALUATION OF BIBLIOGRAPHY
For those seeking references and articles in specific
areas of game theory, the excellent bibliography by
Batchelor^ is recommended as well as the Index of Publica-
nstions of the Rand Corporation^ . The Rand Corporation has
sponsored the work of a number of men in this area. Both
sources are well indexed.
Among texts dealing with the subject, Introduction to
Operations Research by Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff-^ is
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good and includes the most complete treatment of competitive
bidding models encountered in this study. The book, Mathe -
matical Methods of Operations Research by Saaty^, is also
recommended.
A very different approach to game theory is found in
Executive Decisions and Operations Research by Miller and
Starr^ . The treatment is rooted in decision theory and a
general, non-mathematical, presentation is given. One of
the better known works in game theory is the Compleat Stra -
tegist by Williams-^ which is suggested to those with a
limited background in mathematics.
A variety of articles on applications and extensions
of game theory can be found in the pages of the Journal of
LSj
41
40the Operations Research Society of America and in Manage -
ment Science .
For those interested in applications of game theory in
42the area of war games, the paper by Dresher , covers some
interesting aspects of target selection and prediction as
well as optimal military strategy and tactics.
MATHEMATICAL METHODS
In the theory of games, we are dealing with systems
in which two or more decision makers are in a competitive
situation and in which the outcome is controlled by the
decisions of all players. While not all competitive situa-
tions can be analyzed by means of game theory, there are
many military, social, and economic situations which are
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applicable. In line with the subject of this thesis, our
purpose in examining game theory is to set forth methods
for optimizing the strategy of a player.
A competitive game has the following four properties:
a. The number of players is finite.
b. Each of the N players has a finite group of pos-
sible courses of action which need not be the
same for each player.
c. A play in the game occurs when each competitor
selects one of his alternatives. It is assumed
that selections are made simultaneously and with-
out knowledge of the choices of other players.
d. The outcome of a play determines a set of pay-
offs (positive, negative, or zero), one for each
player.
In a game where there are N players, and player i has
n. possible courses of action, there are n,,np,... n^. pos-
sible outcomes for each play. An outcome 9 results in a





then the game is called a zero-sum game. That is, if the
sum of all payoffs to all players is zero, positive to some
and negative to others, it is a zero-sum game. Poker is
such a game.

The strategy of a player is the decision rule he uses
for selecting a course of action. The. decision rule should
not require definite information about an opponents choice.
A pure strategy is a decision by a player in advance of all
plays, to select a single course of action which he then
follows for all plays regardless of the outcome. A mixed
strategy is a decision, in advance of all plays, to select
an alternative for each play in accordance with some parti-
cular probability distribution. A mixed strategy is more
advantageous than a pure strategy after the pattern of play
becomes evident in that players are unable to predict the
next play of their opponents.
A pure strategy is frequently identified by a single
number such as 1 or 2 representing the course of action
selected from a!Ul available alternatives. A mixed strategy,
for a player with m possible courses of action, is denoted
by the set, X, of m non-negative numbers whose sum is unity,
representing the probabilities with which each alternative
is chosen. If x. is the probability of choosing course i,
then the set X is (x n , x , x )±2 m
where x. ^ (i = 1, 2, . . . . , m)
i=m (2-2)
and ) x = 1
i=l
It will be recognized that a pure strategy is a special
case of a mixed strategy where all of the x. are zero except
one which has a value of 1. A player may select any one of
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m pure strategies but he has an infinite number of possible
mixed strategies.
Our purpose here is to select the optimal strategy
for a player and for this we must have a criterion of opti-
mality. The criterion normally used is known as the maxi-
mum criterion. This can be explained in that every player
must be regarded as desiring to maximize his returns and
minimize his losses. These desires are in conflict with
those of other players since some player must lose if
another is to win. The solution then consists of specify-
ing the strategies for each player which will maximize his
return as a winner and minimize his loss if he is a loser.
Two Person Zero-Sum Games
A game with only two players A and B is most conven-
iently described by means of a pair of matricies. Row
designations for each matrix are the courses of action avail-
able to A; column designations are the courses available to
B; cell entries are the corresponding payments to A for one
matrix and to B for the other matrix . In a zero-sum two
person game, the cell entry in B's payoff matrix is the nega-
tive of the corresponding entry in A's payoff matrix, and
for this reason problems are usually worked out using only
one matrix.
All two person zero-sum games can be solved. The simp-
lest type of game is one where the stable optimal strategies
are pure strategies. This is the case only if the payoff
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matrix contains a saddle point. The saddle point is the
element of a matrix that is both the lowest element in its
row and the highest element in its column. In other words,
a saddle point is at once the largest of the row minima and
the smallest of the column maxima.
In such instances, the solution is for player A to
follow a pure strategy corresponding to the row through the
saddle point and for B to use his pure strategy correspond-
ing to the column through the saddle point. The value of
the game to a player is his expected gain in one play of the
game when both players use their optimal strategies.
For purposes of illustration, a payoff matrix is given
below in which the row minima have been circled and the






I II III IV V
9 3 l s ®
6 5 © 6 7
© k 3 3 \n
5 6 2 2 ®
It can be seen that a saddle point of 4 exists in this
case. The optimal strategies of players A and B are thus II
and III respectively. The value of the game to A is k and
to B it is -4. when B learns that A is playing strategy II,




When there is no saddle point, the best strategies are
mixed strategies and the solution to the game consists of
evaluating the probabilities with which each pure strategy
should be used. If a mixed strategy is utilized a minimum
gain cannot be assured on any specific play, however, we
attempt to insure that the minimum possible value of the
expected gain will be as large as possible.
Let us assume a competive two person zero-sum game








It will be noted that there is no saddle point. Search-
ing for pure strategies, A finds I to be most advantageous
and B selects III, assuring themselves of gains of at least
-1 and -2 respectively. (it will be recalled that the payoff
to B is the negative of that in A's matrix.) If the players
start with their pure strategies, A soon discovers that B
always chooses III and realizes that he, A, can increase his
gain from 1 to 2 by playing II. B then shifts to II to in-
crease his gain to 2 on each play. The strategy for each
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thus becomes one of continuous change. It is also true
that, if one player ever realizes that the other is using a
fixed pattern or sequence of strategies, he will be able to
anticipate the next play of his opponent. A good way to
avoid a fixed pattern of play is to make the strategy for
each play a random variable.
Let X = (x-,, x2 , x-^) and Y = (y-,, y2 , y^) indicate the
optimum mixed strategies for A and B respectively. The prob-
ability that A will play i is x. and the probability that B
will play j is y.. The gain to A at each play now becomes
a random variable a and the expected payoff of a play to A
is:
E(a;X,Y) =£ a±jX±yj (2-3)
ij
where a. . is the gain to A when A plays i and B plays j.
Without regard to Y, A seeks to choose X so that his
expected gain exceeds some quantity v., . The expected pay-
off for B similarly becomes:
E(-ajXr)
=2_, ("aijKy j ( 2'4 ' -
IJ
B plays so that his expected gain exceeds a quantity
v2 * Designating optimum strategies as X and Y for A and B
respectively, we must then satisfy the following conditions:
E(a;XQ,Y) ^ v± for all Y (2-5)
E(-a;X,YQ ) £ vg for all X (2-6)
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One of the theorems developed by Von Neumann states
that in any zero-sum two person game, the quantities v,
and Vp above, are the negatives of each other. Substitut-
ing v for v, and -v for vp , the following relations are
obtained. Note that in equation (2-8), reversing the in-
equality sign causes the negative signs to be dropped.
E(a;XQ ,Y) £ v for all Y (2-7)
E(ajX1YQ ) < v for all X (2-8)
Therefore:
E(a;X ,YQ ) = v (2-9)
The interpretation of this is that if both players
use their optimal minimax strategies, their actual expected
gains coincide with their minimax expected gains.
Applying the foregoing to the numerical example on
page and substituting the values of a. . in (2-7), we
-J-
J








^x^) + y 2 ( 2xi ~ 2x2 + ^x^
(2-10)
+ y^(x1 + 2x2 - 3x5 ) ;> v
Since the foregoing expression is true for all y ., it must
be true when any two of the y . are zero and the third is
one. This observation allows us to create from the rela-





2 -r ^X^ ^-X-, + X^ +
2x - 2x2 + 4x, ^ v (2-11)
xl + 2x2 " ^X3 = v
The first of these was obtained by setting y1 = y~ = 0;
y, a 1. The second by setting y = y-^ = 0; y~ = 1 and the
third by setting y_ a l; y a jL 0.
By a process similar to that used to obtain (2-10),
we may write an expression for the expected gain to B and
use this to write three more inequalities similar to those
in (2-11) above.
~yl + 2y2 + y5 a v
yl " 2y2 + 2y3 < v (2-12)
l>y1 + 4y2 - 3y^ = v
It is also true that:
x
± s
(i = 1, 2, 3)
(2-13)
y± = o (i=i, 2, 3)
Since the sum of the probabilities x., is equal to 1
from (2-2), we can also write:
X, + Xp + X, =1




The equations and inequations included in (2-11) through
(2-14), describe the seven unknowns x., y. and v. It is
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apparent that not all the x. and y i can be zero, but it is
possible for equality signs to hold in all the relation-
ships of (2-11) and (2-12). This is first assumed to be
the case and we can undertake a solution of the following










+ 4x, = v




+ 2y2 + y^ = v (2-15)




+ ^y2 - 3y^ = v
X-,+ Xp + X-, = 1
y1 + y2 + y^ = 1
If positive solutions are found for the x. and y.,
then all relations are satisfied. If not, one or more of
the equality signs in (2-15) must be replaced by inequali-
ties until positive solutions are found.




3 yi y2 y3
v
17/46 20/46 9/46 14/46 12/46 20/46 30/46
Note that A now has an expected gain per play of 30/46,
where with his best pure strategy he could only be sure of
not losing more than 1. B now has an expected loss of
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-50/46, where with a pure strategy he could not be sure of
losing less than 2.
Solution of Rectangular Games
Finite two-person zero-sum games are referred to as
rectangular games. Three theorems due to Von Neumann are
basic to the solution of rectangular games and will be re-
viewed here in brief.
Theorem 1. Every rectangular game has a value and a
player of a rectangular game always has an optimal strategy.
Theorem 2. v*, X*, and Y* are respectively the value
of a rectangular game and optimal strategies for players
Pn and Pp, if for pure strategies the following relations
are true:
E(X ,Y*) £ v* for every pure strategy X of P1 (2-l6)
E(X*,Y ) £ v* for every pure strategy Y of Pp (2-17)
Theorem 1 indicates that each rectangular game has a
solution with a value equal to some finite number. The
theorem does not say that each game has a unique solution
and there may be more than one optimal strategy.
Theorem 2 serves to check proposed solutions and if
the relations do not hold for the proposed solution, it is
not valid.
With this background, let us examine briefly a few of











If the pay-off matrix has a saddle point, the solution
is direct and need not be considered further. However for
purposes of discussion let us assume that the game has no
saddle point. For this situation it may be shown that the









If these relations were not true, a saddle point would
exist.
Let the general solution of this game be
where £ x < 1





allyo + a12 (l
-yo' 1 vo for Al
a21yo + a22 (l
"yo) < vo for A2
(2-20)
allxo + a21 ^'^ > vo
for Bl







It has been demonstrated ^ that these four inequali-
ties have a solution only when the equalities hold, the solu-
tion being:
V
o = C Kla22 " a12a21 )]/[(all + a22> " (a12 + a 21 )]
(2-21)
x = ( a22 ~ a21 '' 11 "*" a22 "" 12 "** a21
(2-22)
yo = (a22 " a12 }/[(all + a22 } " (a12 + a21 )]
(2-23)





















aii + a22 j - (a12 + a21^
'
11 21 -I ^or p(an + a22 j - (a12 + a21 J 2
(2-25)
A method for interpreting these two equations was pre-
sented by J. D. Williams , which he terms the method of
oddments. Williams calls the difference between two num-
bers in a row or column an oddment. He terms the ratio
of the two relative frequencies of any player, odds. The
optimal mixed strategy for P, thus is to play A-, and A?
with the odds of oddment a?2 - a?1 to oddment a-,-, - a-, 2 .
The optimal mixed strategy for player P? is to play B, and
Bp with odds of oddment ap? - a-, 2 to oddment a-,-, - ap -,.






Then the optimal odds for player P.. are 5 to 5 and he
should thus play alternate A-, 3/8 of the time and Ap 5/8
of the time.
M X N Games
Several methods have been developed for solution of
games of this type. All are relatively long and no attempt




In selecting an approach to a game and before attempt-
ing a solution, two steps should be taken. As stated earlier,
the first thing to do is to examine the problem for a saddle
point. Failing this, certain alternatives can be eliminated
by checking for what is termed dominance. When the payoffs
for alternative A, are greater or equal to each of the cor-
responding payoffs for A? , A-, is then said to dominate and
Ap may be disregarded. The concept of dominance may be
extended to more than two alternatives at a time. McKinsey •*
46
and Von Neumann give detailed examples of this approach.
Ficticious Play Solution
47George ¥. Brown's ' method of solution by ficticious
play is based on a hypothetical series of consecutive plays'
of the game and uses an infinite sequence of steps to reach
a solution. In the first play, P, selects A-, and P? plays
B.,. Thereafter each player chooses the optimum pure strategy
against the mixture represented by all of his opponents
48past plays. Saaty presents a good example of this method.
There are other techniques of solution including the geomet-
ric, algebraic, matrix and Kernel methods. For examples and
for further information on these- methods, the reader is re-
liQ RQ
ferred to Saaty ^ or McKinsey-' .
Linear Programming Solution
SIIt has been shown by Dantzig-^ that every game problem
can be transformed into a linear programming problem and
vice versa. Saaty-^ presents some examples of how this is
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accomplished and it is sufficient for us to note that
Dantzig has proven the validity of this transformation and
it becomes a valuable tool in both the solution of game
and linear programming problems.
N Person Zero-Sum Games
It should be noted that we have been dealing with rela-
tively simple games involving two players. No generally
acceptable definition of a solution of an n person zero-
sum game yet exists. One reason for the lack of an accept-
able definition is that coalitions can form when more than
two players participate. Von Neumann and Morgenstern-^
have suggested an approach based on possible formation of
coalitions involving dominance. However their definition
of a solution does not show how to find optimal strategies
nor indicate what the final outcome will be. For these
reasons Von Neumanns definition of n-person games has not
had wide acceptance.
Non-Zero Sum Games
A discussion of the methods of game theory would not
be complete without some mention of non-zero sum games.
Here too, there is no generally acceptable definition of a
solution. Von Neumann suggests an approach introducing a
ficticious player assigning him such payoffs that the game
is reduced to a zero-sum game. The solution is then
attempted by methods applicable for zero-sum games. However,
there are infinitely many solutions and no acceptable defini-
tion has been found.
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APPLICATION OP GAME THEORY
The most extensive applications of game theory have
been in the area of military warfare. It has also been
applied to economic problems involving commercial compe-
tition and in both cases the complexities of the problem
must be simplified by various assumptions to make it amen-
able to analysis. This creates some doubt as to the valid-
ity of the results, especially where the game gives nearly
equal opportunity to the players. In the case of war games,
frequently one side has a considerable advantage and the use
of game theory analysis will usually reveal this advantage
which might otherwise remain obscured.
In the area of military petroleum problems, the petro-
leum logistics involved would usually be a portion of the
battle game which will not be treated here. There is, how-
ever, an application of game theory in the area of compe-
titive bidding which has a direct bearing on military petro-
leum procurement which will be presented here as an example.
While this competitive situation differs from the strict
sense of a competitive game, it is possible to use similar
means of analysis.
Competitive Bidding
As a simple case, let us assume a refiner engaged in
bidding on military petroleum contracts, makes it a practise
to record, in addition to his own bid, his cost estimate K
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and the lowest bid B by his opponent. The refiner finds





follows a normal distribution f(x) with a mean of 0.15 and




Graphical Solution of Equation (2-32)
x
If the refiner is interested in maximizing his expected
profit on each contract, and if it is assumed that his com-
petitors bidding habits will not change, what should the
refiners bidding strategy be?
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Let A be the refiners' bid and B be the lowest compet-
ing bid. The refiners' profit P is thus:
P = A - K if A<B
(2-26)
P = if A > B
Let E(P;A) signify the expected profit with bid A.
Then:
E(P;A) = (A - K)P if A < B (2-27)






E(P;A) = KZP if Z < x
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is maximized by the solution Z of the equation
>
f (x) dx - Z f (Z) = (2-32)
-.00
Graphically, E(P;Z) is a maximum when the two cross




Numerically, Z may be found by using tables of ordinates
and areas of normal distribution. In this instance,
Z = 0. 117 is a solution to the foregoing equation. Thus
the refiners optimum bidding strategy is to add 11.7$ "to
his own cost K, in preparing his bid.
A critical assumption is that the competitors will not
change their bidding habits. In the case where only two
bidders are in competition, such an assumption will not
hold, however, it is nore likely that where several competi-
tors exist, it may be more reasonable to assume that the
bidding pattern will not change.
In the case of petroleum refiners, competing companies
have a fair amount of information on their opponents capa-
bilities and markets plus a reasonably good estimate of
their costs. This information enables them to bid more
intelligently, no doubt, than the refiner in the example.
It is known that petroleum refiners in at least a few cases,
have prepared programs for computer calculation of bids.






Probably more work has been directed toward inventory
control than toward any other problem area in business,
industry, and government. In spite of this, or perhaps
because of it, a problem in terminology exists in the area.
Moreover, there are widely divergent views on what research
In this area should include. Some references treat inven-
tory systems as record-keeping problems involving quantities
of stock while others take a broader view and consider the
overall problem of stocks and inventory investment. Still
others are concerned with what items to stock, quantities,
and utilization of facilities. The diversity stems from
the many facets of what has been called the inventory sys-
tem and the large variety of systems found in practise.
In this thesis the basic characteristics of inventory
systems, input, inventory levels, and output as well as the
costs associated with these factors, will be discussed and
and applied in a few models. The aim in the handling of
each inventory problem is one of optimizing costs within
the limits of effectiveness required by management policies.
Historically, one of the earliest efforts at analysis
of inventory systems was made by F. W. Harris in 1915-




and developed a formula for the determination of optimal
lot size.-^
qo «^2rc5/Cl (5-1)
In this formula q is the economic lot size, r is the rate
o
of requirements per unit time, c ± s the carrying cost of
one unit in inventory per unit time, and c^ is the cost of
replacing inventory. Application of this formula has been
extensive; however, Harris assumed that the rate of require-
ments were known, that no shortages occurred, and that lead
time could "be disregarded. These limitations made it use-
ful only in special cases and improvements were sought.
Cooper in 1926 and Pry in 1928 analyzed systems with
varying production and demand. A significant advance was
made by Pry when he showed that the theory of probability
can be applied to some inventory systems when requirements
are not known with certainty.
Another important step was taken by Raymond who made
the first effort to analyze and develop a theory of inven-
tory systems in his book Quantity and Economy in Manufac -
ture published in 1931 and no longer in print. 5°
Dvoretsky, Kiefer and Wolfowitz-" published a paper,
"The Inventory Problem", in 1952 in which they studied
systems of a general nature utilizing extensive mathemati-
cal and statistical methods and endeavored to provide solu-
tions for general cases. while they were successful in
obtaining some unique solutions, there is some danger in
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applying general solutions to the analysis of specific
inventory systems and their work is chiefly of theoreti-
cal interest.
The approach taken by Arrow, Harris, and Marschak-" , as
well as Whit in , was to analyze specific hypothetical sys-
tems encountered in practise and apply the explicit rules
developed to actual cases.
A different approach by Naddor and others, places
emphasis on the development of methods of analysis. Their
intent is to develop models of elementary systems and analyze
more complicated systems as extensions of the basic models.
In reviewing the numerous sources of information on inventory
theory, the text by Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff is con-
sidered the best for those seeking basic knowledge on in-
ventory and purchasing. Another recommended source is Pro-
6?duction Planning and Inventory Control by Magee
A review of the references and bibliography at the end
of this thesis will suggest additional sources of informa-
63tion. The periodical, Management Science , is an excellent
source of information on inventory theory and other related
subjects.
ANALYSIS OF INVENTORY SYSTEMS
An inventory system is usually considered to be one in
which the following types of costs are significant, and in
which any two or all three are subject to control:
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1. the cost of carrying inventories,
2. the cost of incurring shortages,
3. the cost of replenishing inventories.
The first cost relates to inventory investment, stor-
age and handling costs, and losses due to spoilage, evapora-
tion, etc. The second, shortage cost, concerns the cost due
to lost sales, overtime, special handling, etc. The third
cost is that of ordering, machine set up, etc. The general
terms for the three costs are surplus cost, shortage cost
and set-up cost. As will be noted in some applications in-
volving use of inventory theory, all other costs become
significant in actual cases and problems do not limit them-
selves to the area of inventories alone. Actual problems
frequently require use of other optimization techniques in
order to avoid what we have termed sub-optimization.
Inventory Problems
An inventory problem is one of making optimal decisions
with respect to an inventory system in order to minimize the
total cost of the system. The measure of effectiveness in
inventory problems is one of costs. It is assumed that all
shortages, surpluses and set-ups can be expressed in common
units of the measure of effectiveness even though the units
may not be dollars.
Control of Variables
While it has been indicated that the surplus, shortage
and set-up costs are the factors which we desire to control,
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the optimal decisions designed to minimize total costs are
normally made in terms of time and quantity. More specific-
ally, the decision is frequently one of when to replenish
the inventory and by how much. The variables thus subject
to control are usually time and quantity.
Elements of Inventory Systems
The three elements of inventory systems are output,
input, and costs. Output refers to what is removed or
issued from inventory. Input includes what is received or
taken into inventory and costs refers to the three costs
mentioned earlier (surplus, shortage and set-up costs).
Output : In several respects, the output of a system is the
most important element. Inventories are maintained to fill
demands. The demand or output cannot usually be controlled
but the pattern of output in terms of time and quantity
has a significant bearing on the operation of the system.
The output may be variable or constant. when accurate ad-
vance information about the size of the output is available,
it is said to be known with certainty. When not known it
may be subject to a known probability distribution. The
output rate or demand rate is the output size per unit
time and it may be constant or vary in a manner similar to
the output size.
Output patterns vary widely but may generally be de-
scribed mathematically if sufficient data are available. If
the output size is x during an interval of time t, the output
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pattern may follow one of the patterns in Figure 6. All x
units may be drawn at the beginning or at the end of the













The output patterns shown can be described by:
n
Q(T) = S - x sTT/t (3-2)
where Q(T) is the total inventory at time T
S is the inventory when T =
x is the output during the interval t
n is the output pattern index
t is the scheduling period
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Input : The input element can generally be controlled. In-
put involves not only the quantity scheduled to be taken
into inventory, but the time of ordering or scheduling as
well as the time of receipt into stock. The scheduling
period is the term used for the period between decisions
regarding inputs. This cannot always be controlled. Lead
time is the period between scheduling or ordering and re-
ceipt and this too is frequently not subject to control.
The input size is defined as the quantity ordered or
scheduled for input. Numerous inventory problems are con-
cerned with the optimization of the input size in which
case it is frequently called the optimal or economic lot
size.
Input patterns are related to the input period which
is the time interval t' during which the input size q is
being added to the inventory. The average input rate p
is the ratio of input size to input period or units of in-
put per unit time.
p = q/t» (3-3)
Input patterns vary widely as illustrated in Figure 7
and each type is important in some particular problem.
All of the patterns shown have an input size q being
added at average input rate p. This group of patterns can
be described by:
Q(T) = on/ T/t ' = q7Tp/q (3-4)
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where: Q(T) Inventory at time T
q Input size
t ' Input period
p 'Average input rate (p

















Costs : The cost element of inventory systems is considered
to have been covered sufficiently in the section headed Analy-
sis of Inventory Systems on page 63. If any further clarifi-
cation of the types of costs included under the titles of
surplus costs, shortage costs, and set-up costs is desired,
the following references are recommended: 64, 65.
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APPLICATIONS OP INVENTORY THEORY
In order to illustrate the application of inventory
models, a few types will be presented here, largely in the
form of examples. Among basic inventory systems, there
are three types all of which involve the balancing of two
of the three types of costs; surplus, shortage and set-up.
Balancing Surplus and Shortage Costs
The following conditions are known:
c-z (set-up cost) = constant
t (scheduling period) = constant
r (output ratio in units per unit time) = constant
C-. (surplus cost of one unit per unit time) = constant
c 2 (shortage cost of one unit per unit time) = constant
The inventory level S at the beginning of each schedul-
ing period is the only variable subject to control in this
model. The system may be illustrated graphically as shown
in Figure 8.
System with Surplus and Shortage
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The sawtooth line in the figure represents the inventory
level at various times. The initial inventory level S is
drawn down at a constant rate r. At time t-., the inventory
reaches zero and a shortage s occurs. The demands which
represent shortages are accumulated and stock is issued to
cover these demands after the inventory is replenished. In-
put q is sufficient to cover the shortage and raise the in-.
ventory level again to S. Note that the vertical input
line indicates practically instantaneous receipt of stock
at each scheduling period t .





where r is the rate of output and t is the scheduling
period or time between inputs.
The inventory level, s, which is actually the amount
of shortage at the end of the scheduling period, is depen-
dent upon the variable S as well as on the other conditions
given. Although s is a negative inventory, it is treated




The solution of this system requires the determination
of SQ , the optimal inventory level, and C , the optimal
(minimum) total cost per unit time.
The costs of the system are defined by the equations:
Surplus cost per unit time C, = I. c (3-6)
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Shortage cost per unit time C 2 = IpC, (3-7)
Setup cost per unit time C, = Nc^ = c-,/t (5-8)
where I., and I p respectively, are the average surplus and
shortage during a unit of time and N is the number of set-
ups per unit time.
Using equations (5-6), (j3-7)» and (5-8) as well as
the relationships from Figure 8, one may derive the follow-
ing equations which describe the surplus costs and shortage






















The derivation of (5-9) can be explained briefly by
pointing out that the term (S/2) represents the average
surplus inventory and that the term (t-,/t ) represents
that proportion of the scheduling period during which a
surplus exists. The product of these terms multiplied by
c, , the surplus cost of one unit per unit time, thus equals
the total cost of surplus CL. The alternate form of the
equation is obtained by substituting the relation t., = S/r
which is the time required to deplete the initial inventory
S at output rate r. Equation (5-10) is derived similarly.
Adding (5-9) and (5-10) one may obtain the total cost
per unit time C which is subject to control since C^, the
setup cost, is constant.















S + c^tp/2 (3-11)
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This equation, usually called the total cost equation,
can be used to arrive at the optimal decision rules by dif-
ferentiating, setting the derivative dC/dS equal to zero,
and solving for S , the optimal inventory level. The opti-




/(c1+c 2 ) (3-12)
This value of S can be substituted in equation (3-11) to













The foregoing model will be applied here in an example
to illustrate the use of the equations.
A fuel terminal uses 2*1-00 pump seals annually due to
rapid wear. When a seal is needed but not available, leak-
age occurs costing $9 per month. 200 seals are ordered each
month and delivered in one day. Each seal costs $80. In-
ventory carrying cost is 15$ per year.
In terms of the designations given:
(Scheduling period) t = 1/12 year
(Output rate) r = 2400 per year
(Unit surplus cost) c-, = $80 x 0.15 = $12 per seal
per year.
(Unit shortage
cost) Cp = $9 per part per month = $108





C = 0.3 S2 - 108 S-+ 10,800
If no shortages were permitted, S would have to equal 200
seals in which case the total cost would be $1200 per year.
However, when shortages are allowed and surplus and shortage
costs are balanced, the optimal inventory level, from equa-
tion (3-12), becomes; S = 180 seals. The minimum total
cost for the year is then S1080 per year.
Balancing Surplus and Set-up Costs
An inventory system in which the cost and consequences
of shortage is so high in terms of lost operating time, etc.
,
that shortages are unacceptable, may still be optimized by
balancing the surplus and setup costs. Such a system is un-
doubtedly appropriate for most packaged petroleum products
for military use in that a shortage of a relatively inexpen-
sive special purpose grease may prevent the operation of an
aircraft or other vital equipment. In setting up this parti-
cular model, no reserve inventory level is included. This
would not be the practise in an actual case but since a
reserve level would simply constitute the addition of a
constant cost, the treatment is no less applicable. An


















System with Surplus and Setup Cost
Time
The conditions describing the system are:
(No shortages allowed) I? =
(Output rate in units
per unit time)
(Cost of carrying one
unit per unit time)




The variables in this model are the input q and the
scheduling period t . The relationship between the vari'
ables is:
q = rt (3"-l4)
It is assumed that the variable subject to control is
q the input quantity. In this system, since no reserve
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exists, the initial inventory S is equal to q and the short-
age carryover, s, is zero since no shortage is allowed.
The average inventory level during the scheduling
period t is I1 = q/2, thus by equation (3-6)
C1 = qC;L/2 (3-15)
and by equations (3-8) and (3-1*0 one may write:
C
3
= VS = r°3/q D *l6)
The total cost equation then becomes:
C = C
1
+ C^ = qCl/2 + rc^/q (3-17)
By differentiating and setting the derivative dC/dq equal
to zero, we can solve for the optimal value of q which gives




Equation (3 -18) is frequently termed the "economic lot size"
formula.
Entering q in (3-1*0 and (3-17) is then:
tQ =^2c5/(rc1 ) (3-19)
CQ =^2rClc5 (3-20)
The two equations (3 -18) and (3
-19), provide the opti-
mal lot size and optimal scheduling period as a basis for
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the decision rules in operating the system in which surplus
and setup costs are balanced while no shortages are allowed.
Equation (3-20) describes the minimum cost of such a system.
Pump Seal Problem (No shortage allowed)
The model of the foregoing system, in which no short-
ages were allowed, can be applied in the pump seal problem
utilized in the previous application. In this instance we
will assume that the scheduling period, t , is variable and
not fixed; that no shortages are permitted; and that the
terminal operator decides to make the seals with a setup
cost of $350 for each production run.
In this case it is necessary to decide how many seals
should be made in each production run and how often this is
to be done.
Prom the previous problem, it is given that:
Output rate r = 2400 seals per year
Surplus cost c, = $12 per seal per year
Setup cost c^, = $350 per setup
Substituting in equations (3-18), (3 -19), and (3-20):
Optimal lot size = q = 374 parts per run
Optimal scheduling
period
Optimal total cost = C^ = $4,488
=,t = I.87 months
Application Involving Probabalistic Output
An inventory system with a probability distribution of



















System with Probability Distribution of Output
Note that during each scheduling period, t_, the system
may either have an output size x which is smaller or equal
to the initial inventory level S, or it may be that x is
larger than S. For each of these two cases the distribu-









Typical Cases with Probability of Output
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the pump seal problem, the following probability distribu-
tion is assumed:
X 100 200 300
—
400 500






Probability Distribution of Output
In this problem it will also be assumed that the
scheduling period, t , is fixed at one month. It is also
given that:
Unit surplus cost c 1 = $12 per unit per year
Unit shortage cost c p = $108 per unit per year
Calculations are presented here in tabular form. The
descriptions entered at the head of each column \tfill assist
in following the computation.
The computations were initiated by assuming various in-
ventory levels, S, and values of output, x, varying from
to 500. One can then calculate the average inventory for
cases where there is no shortage quite simply. For example,
when S is 100 and x is 100, the inventory is drawn down to
zero at the end of the scheduling period and the average
inventory for the month is 100/2 = 50. When there is a
shortage, as when S is 100 and x is 200, the inventory is
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200 .35 25 25 300 2700 1050
300 .15 17 67 204 7236 1116
400 .10 12 112 144 12096 1224
500 .05 10 160 120 17280 870 4260 4560
200 .15 200 2400 360
100 .20 150 1800 360
200
• 35 100 1200 420 1140
300 .15 67 17 804 1836 396
400 .10 50 50 600 5400 600












200 .35 150 1800 630 156O
. 300 .15 104 4 1248 432 252
400 .10 78 28 936 3024 396
500 .05 62 62 744 6696 372 1020 2580
300 .15 300 3600 540
100 .20 ,250 3000 600
200 • 35 200 2400 840
300 .15 150 1800 270 2250
400 .10 112 12 1344 1296 264
500 .05 90 40 1080 4320 270 534 2784
Table 2
Solution of System with Probability Distribution of Output
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One may assume that an output of size x will occur dur-
ing t with a probability P(x). When x < S the average sur-
plus inventory is S-x/2 and the total surplus cost per unit
time is (S-x/2)c.,. The total expected cost C& for Case A




= c-^T (S-x/2) P(x) (5-21)
x=x^
In Case B, when x > S, the total expected cost C,




= Z f^\+ (x-S) 2c 2 ]/(2x) j P(x)D-22)
x=S+l L **'
Note that the output size x = rt . In this derivation x is
substituted for (rt ) in Equation (3-11).










.' + c 2 ^
(l/2)(x-S) 2 [P(x)/x] ' (3-23)
x=S+l
Pump Seal Problem with Probability Distribution of Output
In actual cases, the output of an inventory system is
rarely constant but if sufficient data are available, a prob'
ability distribution for output size can be determined. In
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case the average inventory is 100/2 = 50 for only one half
of the month so for purposes of this computation, the actual
average during the scheduling period of one month is 25-
Columns CL and Cp are obtained by multiplying the average
surplus or shortage by the unit surplus or unit shortage
costs as applicable. The remainder of the calculation is
generally straight -forward.
In order to obtain the optimum inventory level SQ for
this problem as well as the corresponding minimum cost, it
is necessary to use interpolation and some trial and error
calculations. In this instance, the approximate values of
S can be seen to lie between 200 and 300 and comparatively
close to 250. By additional computation it appears that SQ
is approximately 235 seals at which inventory level the
minimum total cost C is- $2576 per year.
Application of Inventory Theory in Military Tanker and Termi '
nal Operations
One of the important problems facing military and in-
dustrial petroleum management, is that of optimizing the
operation of systems encompassing the movement, storage and
distribution of bulk petroleum products. The large amount
of capital and effort expended in the operation of such
systems, makes them an. important field for analysis.
The military services are concerned with systems in-
volving the transportation of products by tanker from re-
fineries to terminals for storage and distribution. The
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petroleum industry operates similar systems in that refined
products are transported by tanker to regional terminals
for storage and distribution. The industry operates another
such system in the tanker movement of crude oil from
terminals to refineries for processing. As operated by
industry, these two systems are, of course, related in that
the output of the crude oil system becomes the input of the
refined product system.
The similarity of the military and industrial refinery -
tanker - terminal systems, suggests that optimization tech-
niques applied by industry may prove valuable to the mili-
tary services. \It is the purpose and intent of this thesis
to present such applications, and we will proceed on the
assumption that recognition of the basic factors involved
will assist toward a solution.
Inventory - Queueing Systems
Tanker-terminal systems are essentially inventory sys-
tems, however, the problems associated with the arrival of
tankers for service at a refinery or terminal involves cer-
tain aspects of queueing theory. Since the subject of queue-
ing has not been covered in this thesis, it is considered
that a brief discussion of the elements of queueing situations
and their solution by Monte Carlo methods should be included
at this point as an aid to understanding what will follow.
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Elements of Queueing Theory
Queueing or waiting line theory concerns the attempt
to describe and handle problems of organization and planning
in the face of randomly fluctuating demands for a servive
being performed. Situations frequently occur in which units
arriving for service must wait before being serviced. If
the conditions controlling arrivals, service times, and the
order of servicing are known, then the nature of the waiting
line can be analyzed mathematically.
Two general classifications can be made, one a determi-
nate type of operation and the other indeterminate. In the
former all aspects of the system are known as functions of
time and the state of the system can be predicted at any
time. In the indeterminate case, aspects of the system are
known only in terms of probabilities.
The several characteristics of a queue, such as the num-
ber in line at any instant or the waiting time experienced
by a particular arrival, are random variables rather than
being functionally dependent on time. Arrivals and service
times are also considered to be random variables. Thus in
determining the values of the characteristics of a queue,
one is concerned with estimating only the average number of
units in the line at any instant, the average time the ser-
vice facility is idle during a day, the average service time
and the average waiting time.
In attempting to optimize a queueing system, the deci-
sion maker uses his knowledge of the average characteristics
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of the queue. He may consider: altering the number of ser-
vice units, changing the average service time, etc.
Poisson Arrivals
For the most part, arrivals do not occur at regular
time intervals but tend to be grouped or scattered in an
uneven manner. Individual Poisson arrivals are completely
independent one another. The assumption of Poisson be-
havior of arrivals requires the presence of a constant X
which is independent of time, length of queue, or other
random characteristics of the queue. The constant X repre-
sents the rate at which units arrive for service.
Monte Carlo Methods in Queueing
Monte Carlo methods are very useful in queueing prob-
lems which are difficult to analyze mathematically. The
Monte Carlo method uses random sampling to play a game with
a system in which an experiment is simulated. In the prob-
lem at hand, the technique consists of simulating the arri-
val of tankers by the use of random sampling. This method
of simulated sampling has some advantages over actual samp-
ling of queue characteristics, in that when done on a digi-
tal computer, years of data can be developed in a few minutes
and those factors which are subject to control can be manipu-
lated. The effects of adding new piers or new tanks to a
terminal system can thus be assessed on paper without actual
re-
installation or disruption of services. Saaty gives an
example of a Monte Carlo solution in a queueing problem.
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Limitations of Queueing Theory
Queueing models should, be regarded as approximations
which serve primarily as guide lines. Arrivals in a sys-
tem may vary from Poisson loading, which is frequently
assumed, but a Poisson input can be regarded as the limit
of disintegration for a scheduled process and thus pro-
vides a backstop to keep the solution within bounds. An
attempt should always be made to solve the queueing problem
at its source, the random input. Any action which can be
taken to schedule or control the input will be helpful.
With this brief background in queueing theory and the
Monte Carlo method, we can proceed to examine the problems
of tanker-terminal systems.
Tanker-Terminal Systems
The similarity between military and industrial tanker-
terminal systems becomes apparent when it is noted that each
must maintain sufficient working or shipping tankage and
pier facilities to handle the loading and discharge of tankers,
The refiner maintains such facilities for the input of crude
oil as well as additional tankage and pier facilities for
the output of refined products. Moreover, the refiner must
maintain additional tankage for seasonal storage of products
such as heating oil. Tankage, comparable to the seasonal
tankage operated by the refiner, is operated by the military
in that extensive tankage is maintained at military terminals
as reserve storage for emergency use.
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The similarity of tanker and barge lifting of products
from military terminals and refineries is less notable but
still generally comparable for purposes of this application.
In the servicing (loading and discharge) of tankers, where
pier and pumping facilities are limited, delays may occur
which are characteristic of queueing situations. The
arrival and servicing rates of tankers becomes a signifi-
cant part of the problem. In most cases, the queueing situ-
ation is not believed acute at military terminals, but the
military system is affected in that tankers arriving at
refineries to lift military products become a part of the
queueing problem at the refinery thus having some effect
on arrivals at military terminals. In times of emergency
this problem could become significant.
Study on Shipping Tankage
Although some attention has been given to the schedul-
ing of tanker movements as transportation and linear pro-
gramming problems, the published articles on tanker-terminal
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systems are extremely limited. An article by J. C. Dickson
describes an operations research effort aim^d at determining
the optimal volume of shipping or working tankage at a re-
finery to handle the loading of tankers. The system described
includes the operation of additional seasonal tankage which
is normally used for holding heating oil in storage to meet
seasonal demands. The system treated _by Dickson is considered
sufficiently similar to the military system to illustrate the
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approach to the problem and the basic factors involved.
The model developed by Dickson has been altered somewhat
in order to fit the military system more closely and is
discussed here.
Description of the Problem
Since tankers do not arrive at fixed intervals and do
not load or discharge a fixed quantity of petroleum pro-
ducts, terminals and refineries must maintain shipping or
working tanks to absorb the fluctuations experienced in
input and output. The consequences of insufficient tankage
may be delay of tankers, inability to load or accept a
tanker, etc. In the case of the refiner, it may also mean
the necessity for altering the entire production schedule
of the refinery.
The problem as seen by Dickson was one of minimizing
costs. The costs considered to be pertinent to the problem
were:
1. Cost of delaying tankers
2. Operating cost of working tanks plus carrying
costs on these tanks
3. Cost of reducing input
4. Cost of pumping product to or from reserve storage
5. Carrying costs on product held in inventory
A schematic representation of the system altered to
correspond to the military petroleum terminal operation is
shown in Figure 12. The symbols used are listed in Table 3.
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i = Day of year being considered
D. = Demand for product, day i
P. = Input of product, day i
T. = Transfer of product from working to storage tanks,
day i




= Inventpry in reserve tanks, day i
S! = Maximum allowable inventory in reserve tanks, day i
CT1 . = Cargo size of j tanker, day i
th
C.Q. . = Cargo size of the j barge, day i
Nm- = Number of tankers, day i
NBi = Number of barges, day i
MT = Expected number of tankers
Li
IVLg = Expected number of barges
u-m = Average cargo of tankers
(xB = Average cargo of barges
T = Maximum allowable transfer rate
max
P = Maximum input
max
P = Planned input
C = Upper decision limit for reducing input
Cu. = Upper decision limit for transfer to reserve storage
Cj. = Lower decision limit for transfer from reserve
storage
CR = Lower decision limit for input increase
P a Capacity of working tanks
S = Capacity of reserve storage tanks
E. = Random variable
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Analysis of the Problem
The requirement or demand for product on day, D., was
considered a function of the inventory in the tanks, planned
input, and a random variable representing the variations in
the arrival of tankers.
The input to the system on day i is designated as P.
and is considered a function of the inventory in the working
tanks and the product to be transferred to the reserve stor-
age tanks. T., the product transferred to reserve storage
on day i, is related to the inventory in both the working
and reserve storage tanks.
A few of the functions developed by Dickson for P., T.
and D. are listed here simply to indicate the nature of some
of the restrictions utilized in the model.
Daily Input, P.
P. = P Daily input is equal to planned input if
the following conditions exist:
(1) CR < ITi < C c ; i.e. inventory Ip . in the working
tanks must be between the limits beyond which it becomes
necessary to increase or decrease input.
(2) Ipi + P - TjL < F; i.e. planned input will not




= Ti max* Tr>ansfer to reserve storage at
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maximum transfer rate when the following conditions exist:
(1) IFi ^ C ; i.e. when the inventory in the shipping
tank exceeds the upper control limit.
(2) S» i ;> Tmax + Tsi ; i.e. pumping Tmax barrels into
tanks containing T . barrels will not exceed the allowable
inventory S'..
Daily Demand
The functions defining demand involve the arrival rate
of tankers and the size of the cargo lifted. In Dickson's
model the arrival rate of tankers was assumed to be a
Poisson distribution after study of actual arrival records.
A provision was included which was designed to consider the
large tankers as scheduled within certain limits but which
would require the arrivals of small tankers to follow the
above mentioned Poisson distribution.
Solution Method
With the foregoing functions defined, Dickson indicates
that inventories on each successive day can be obtained
from material balances. Having this information and the
delay time on tankers, operating costs are calculated.
The values sought from the: model of the system were
the optimal volume of shipping or working tankage and the
control limits: C and C which are the upper limits on re-
ducing input and upper limits for transfer to storage; and
CL and CR which are the lower decision limits on transfer
to storage and increasing input respectively.
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The method employed to obtain a solution v/as the Monte
Carlo technique which was used to simulate the arrival of
tankers and permitted the model to be played rapidly on a
computer for a period equivalent to about ^0 years. The
model was thus used to estimate operating costs while var-
ious values were tried for some of the variables subject
to control. By averaging the operating costs over several
years, a comparatively good estimate of operating costs
was anticipated.
Results and Limitations
The results obtained by Dickson contained a sizeable
error which was attributed primarily to the assumption of
Poisson arrival rates for the tankers. The possibility of
an extreme number of tankers arriving on a particular day
was eliminated by placing limits on the maximum possible
value in the Poisson distribution for tanker arrivals.
However, there was no limit on the number of consecutive
days without an arrival. This error, and probably others,
contributed to the sizeable error in operating costs.
In reviewing the study, Dickson found that because
tankage is normally constructed in large increments of
50,000 to 100,000 barrels per tank, the exact value of the
shipping tankage was not required and the solution was suf-
ficiently accurate to allow selection of the optimum tank-
age. The values of the decision limits, for transferring
product to or from storage and increasing or decreasing in-
put, were found to be within the required range of accuracy.
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Dickson indicates that in any subsequent model, limits
should be placed on the number of arrivals on any day and
the number of days with no arrivals. He also indicates
that future studies should include some type of "anticipator
mechanism" since tanker arrivals are usually known two or
three days in advance in actual cases.
It is considered by the present author that this method
is worthy of study and it is hoped t r,.at the indicated modi-
fications would prove adequate to the military problem. It
is not likely that a general model could be developed to
apply to all terminal situations. The problem of incorrectly
assumed Poisson distribution of tanker arrivals can surely
be corrected. Tanker arrivals are probably best described
as intermediate between Poisson and scheduled. There are
indications that tanker arrivals follow more closely the




TECHNIQUES TO MILITARY PETROLEUM PURCHASING POLICIES
As the nation's largest single purchaser and consumer
of petroleum products, the Defense Department is vitally
interested in the problem of procurement at minimum cost.
Total petroleum purchases by the Defense Petroleum Supply
Agency were slightly in excess of one billion dollars dur-
ing the fiscal year 1961. Relying principally on competi-
tive bidding to secure low prices, the Defense Petroleum
Supply Agency consistently obtains prices well below those
in commercial markets.
The discussion and analysis of purchasing policy pre-
sented in this chapter is intended to develop an avenue of
approach to some of the basic factors involved in competi-
tive bidding in general and petroleum procurement in parti-
cular. It is hoped that an analysis of such factors will
serve to indicate those areas where some of the optimiza-
tion techniques presented in this thesis may be utilized.
Competitive Bidding
The objective of competitive bidding is to purchase a
specified product at minimum cost. In the process of pre-
paring a bid, a potential contractor must exercise his
strategy in competition with that of his rivals. Although
the bidder carries a cushion of profit in his bid, the bid




If because of some technological development all
bidders are able to reduce their costs, it is reasonable
to assume that bid prices would also be reduced as long
as sufficient competition existed. Similarly, if some of
the restrictions placed upon the bidder by the purchaser
are altered, a corresponding change in bid prices may be
expected. Some of the restrictions placed upon the bidder
in the conditions set forth in the invitation for bids are:
the type of contract, delivery requirements, specifications,
quantity, etc. These do not represent all of the constraints
which the bidder must consider, but they are among the major
restrictions established by the purchaser. These conditions
set forth in the invitation for bids, necessarily have a con-
siderable and perhaps measurable effect on the ultimate
price paid by the purchaser.
Analysis of Constraints
In seeking to minimize ultimate purchase prices, the
objective of the buyer becomes one of choosing the constraints
set forth in the invitation for bids in such a manner as to
fulfill the necessary requirements and to permit the bidders
to minimize their costs.
While there are a number of conditions set forth in
the invitation for bids which act as constraints, there are
three which appear to be most important and which may be
subject to some degree of control by the purchaser.
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The three constraints to be discussed are:
1. Material specifications
2. Quantity
5- Timing of Procurement
Material Specifications
It is recognized that specifications for items to be
purchased are rarely subject to the control of the purchas-
ing agency. Specifications, however, do represent a major
part of the cost of any petroleum item. This becomes evi-
der/- when the price paid for each additional octane number
is noted. The problem of optimizing specifications is not
a simple one. Fuel specifications for an individual air-
craft may be determined, but selecting an optimum fuel
specification for a wide range of aircraft would be an
extremely difficult linear programming problem. Any attempt
to determine optimum specifications must consider not only
the minimum standards for successful operation, but safety
factors and the consequences of failure. Fortunately, most
ships and aircraft are designed to fit existing fuels so
the problem of optimum specifications may not be real. The
analysis of optimum specifications is best left to persons
qualified in this area.
Quantity
Military petroleum contracts, for the most part, are
written as indefinite quantity contracts under which the
government contracts for an estimated quantity but is only
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obligated to order a token amount. Under such an arrange-
ment, the government protects itself where fluctuations
in requirements occur. The price increase, if any, which
the government pays for the uncertainty resting with the
contractor is small compared to the advantage gained.
Usually the quantity ordered under the contract very nearly
equals the amount initially estimated and probably no price
differential exists.
Since most military petroleum contracts provide for
delivery on an as-required basis, and since the requirements
of any given terminal or station are reasonably constant
over an extended period, the total quantity contracted for
is roughly proportional to the length of the contract period.
The constraint placed on the bidders in terms of quantity
can thus be said to be the length of the contract period.
Optimum Length of Contract
Numerous military petroleum contracts have a contract
life of six months. This is believed to be relatively short.
Before discussing possible methods of determining the optimum
length of a contract period, let us consider the effects of
a change in the length of the contract.
If the contract period were lengthened, inventory costs
for the government would remain essentially unchanged since
we are considering that petroleum products are ordered only
as required. Similarly, inventory costs for the refiner
would probably not change appreciably since the volume per
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unit time required by the government would remain substanti-
ally unchanged. However, with longer term contracts, the
refiner could conceivably reduce his costs in the areas of
equipment utilization, production scheduling, and possibly
in the cost of raw materials. If our assumption is correct,
reduced costs to the refiner should result in lower prices
to the government.
Let us consider the position of a refiner bidding on
one million barrels of 115/1^5 aviation gasoline. To make
this product requires use of an alkylation unit which will
be ulilized at, perhaps, QOfo of capacity if a contract is
secured but at only ^0% of capacity without a contract.
On the basis of a one year contract it may be that the re-
finer can operate the alkylation unit to advantage, while
with only a six month contract his costs must be spread
over the shorter period. To fulfill a short term contract,
the refiner may even find it cheaper to buy alkylate from
another source and transport it to his refinery. In either
event, the cost to the refiner appears to increase under
the short term contract.
Not all of the factors to be considered indicate longer
term contracts are in order. The fluctuations in the market
in terms of demand and price may cause commercial prices to
drop while the government still holds a contract at a higher
price. Such situations cannot always be predicted. It is
also true that bidders sometimes shave their prices under
that of the successful bidder on the previous contract. Such
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practises are not to be expected over an extended period,
however, and the refiners cost must ultimately be the basis
of his bid.
The solution of such problems must await the develop-
ment of models, collection of data and application of a
great deal of theory. Linear programming models of refinery
processes and the refining industry have been developed as
has been shown. Such models contain assumptions which make
the determination of an optimum length of contract inaccur-
ate. Nonetheless, it is considered that an indication of
the direction in which to move could be determined.
Timing of Procurement
Certain fuels such as heating oil are subject to seasonal
demands which result in fluctuations in market prices. In
such cases, the timing of a solicitation for bids may be
important. If purchases can be made at times when demand
and price are at their seasonal lows, some saving can normally
be expected. No extended discussion of seasonal purchasing
will be attempted here, however, it is considered pertinent
to note that the optimal time to purchase one product is
not likely to be optimal for another product.
Use of Optimization Techniques
All of the foregoing is best reduced to quantitative
terms. The solution. of the problems presented would involve
the use of several of the basic techniques of linear pro-
gramming, inventory theory, game theory, and others not
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discussed in this thesis. Existing linear programming
models of refinery systems might be adapted for use in
determining solutions. Extensive data would be required
and the cost of such an effort would be substantial.
When it is realized that a reduction in the average
purchase price of military petroleum products by as little
as one per cent would result in an annual cost reduction
of about ten million dollars, the potential of such a pro-
ject becomes apparent.
The thoughts expressed in this chapter are not those
of an authority in the field of military petroleum procure-
ment, and there may be ramifications not known to this
author. Much additional study is required before any such




In this thesis an attempt has been made to survey
some of the modern analytical and objective methods for
optimizing decisions. The optimization techniques pre-
sented are applicable to problems encountered in the
operation of military petroleum systems.
The specific techniques covered include: linear pro-
gramming, game theory, and inventory theory. Certain as-
pects of queueing theory and the Monte Carlo method were
described briefly in connection with a problem involving
optimization of tanker-terminal systems.
Sample problems in the area of military petroleum
management were developed and solved utilizing some of
the methods presented. Problems known to be of current
concern to military petroleum management, were discussed
with the intention of developing approaches to possible
solutions.
Time was not available to develop computer programs
for the methods presented. While some problems can be
solved by simple arithmetic, it is considered that use of
a digital computer is necessary to make significant use





Some of the problems considered represent extensions
of existing methods which could be applied directly or
which may be found in current use by military supply acti-
vities. Others will require additional investigation be-
fore the problem can be precisely formulated.
The necessity for precise problem formulation should
be emphasized for it is central to the philosophy of modern
methods for the optimization of operational systems. One
is dealing with problems which must be reduced to precise
mathematical form, and a great amount of ingenuity and
creativeness is necessary to translate a problem into the
terms of a meaningful mathematical model.
The task is difficult on two accounts. First, one
must express ideas in mathematical terms which heretofore
have not been regarded as quantitative. Second, the formu-
lation must be in a form sufficiently tractable that a
numerical solution is feasible. It is for this reason that
a large part of the effort of this thesis was devoted to
problem formulation and the development of analogies between
systems which have been analyzed successfully and systems as
yet unanalyzed within the military petroleum supply system.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the material contained
herein will be of value to those concerned with the manage-
ment and analysis of the operation of the military petroleum
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